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Politics and Inter-Confessional Strife in
post-1989 Romania: From Competition
for Resources to the Redefinition of
National Ideology
Constantin Iordachi
EDITOR'S NOTE
An earlier version of this article was presented at The Socrates Kokkalis Student Workshop :
New Approaches to Southern Europe, at Harvard University, Minda de Gunzburg Center for
European Studies, February 12-13, 1999.
I wish to thank Molly Abraham for revising a preliminary draft.
 [Romanians], wherever they are, if they hate each-
other within their own vicinity, the greatest
reason for their disarray stems from the fact that
some are belonging to the United Greek-Catholic
cult, while others to the Eastern Orthodox cult.
The former name the latter not United, while the
latter name the former United. At the same time,
both parts reserve for themselves that honest,
brotherly and saint Christian name ; if the people
from these lands do not get rid of this pointless
prejudice and do not overcome this old and vicious
religious discord, then they will work against their
own interests.
Dimitrie Tichindeal, 1814.
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I myself lost any hope that the Romanian can have
any positive future. So much our people is harmed
here by priests that they either sympathize with
foreigners or associate exclusively with fellows of
their same religion, rather than as United with
Orthodox and vice-versa. They even do not name
each other Romanians anymore, but the Orthodox
call the other Popeists, while the United call those
not United - Muscals.
Liviu Andrei Pop, 1855
1 Historically,  Romanian  nationalism  has  exhibited  close  similarities  with  the  ethno-
linguistic type of nationalism which characterized most of the national movements in
East-Central  Europe :  national  community  was  defined  primarily  in  terms  of  shared
language and descent. However, the Romanian national ideology has encompassed also an
important  religious  dimension,  with  two  main  components :  Eastern  Orthodox
Christianity in the Old Kingdom and Greek-Catholicism in Transylvania. Although not
valued as  the  most  salient  features  of  the  “Romanianness”,  these  religious  elements
ensured  nevertheless  a  significant  socio-political  influence  for  the  ecclesiastical
leadership,  which  could  occasionally  mobilize  ethno-religious  loyalties  for  obtaining
strategic political gains.
2 The aim of this paper is to explore the tempestuous post-1989 inter-confessional conflict
between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian Greek-Catholic Church, and
the resulting redefinition of the relationship between state and church. I am particularly
interested in the way the two churches have utilized the symbolic bond between religion
and national identity for legitimizing their competing interests ; and how they attempted
to  subsequently  convert  their  symbolic  capital  into  an important  source  of  material
resources. In addition, I will evaluate the overall impact of this religious conflict on the
domestic and foreign policy of Romania. How can we account for the recent crisis in the
relationship  between  the  Romanian  Orthodox  Church  and  the  Romanian  state ?
Furthermore,  do  we assist  to  a  nationalist  political  offensive,  based on an emerging
alliance between the Orthodox Church and nationalist parties ?
3 This  research  is  based  on  media  ecclesiastical  polemics,  parliamentary  debates,  and
various church and state documents. I employ a neo-Weberian methodological approach,
which  treats  the  church  as  an  institution  with  a  dual  character,  hierocratic  and
administrative-territorial.  Max Weber  pointed out  that,  as  a  “compulsory  hierocratic
association”, the church has a monopoly over the manner in which salvation is to be
achieved,  while  as  a  “territorial  and  parochial  organization”,  the  church  exercises
authority over an administrative-territorial area, which serves as a tax-revenue basis1.
This analytical framework is useful for understanding the institutional evolution of the
Church in the modern period, when the generalized process of bureaucratization and
rationalization has strengthened its administrative character. Faced with an increased
secular political pressure, the Church has transformed into a “corporate interest group”,
and  arrived  at  a  compromise  with  the  political  power :  in  exchange  for  political
protection  and  material  resources,  the  church  has  assisted  the  state  in  the
“domestication” of its subjects, by nationalizing the religious community and supporting
the national ideology.
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4 In the same vein,  I  treat  the Orthodox and the Greek-Catholic  Churches as  “interest
groups”.  I  argue that,  due to the sudden liberalization of  religious life,  and with the
inability of the political power to provide a suitable legislative framework, the Greek-
Catholic and Orthodox Churches have faced with an intense rivalry for material resources
and  spiritual  pre-eminence.  This  rivalry  led  to  a  sharp  antagonism.  The  Romanian
Orthodox  Church  (ROC)  refused  to  consider  any  significant  patrimony  retrocession
toward  the  Romanian  Greek-Catholic  Church  United  with  Rome  (RGCC),  openly
disregarded juridical verdicts, and launched a political offensive aimed at questioning the
established relationship between church and state. These actions unavoidably led to open
debates between Greek-Catholic and Orthodox clerics and a succession of crises in their
inter-confessional relationship. Moreover, during the conflict, both churches attempted
to  consolidate  their  political  profile  and to  expand their  privileges,  by  developing a
symbolic-ideological  hegemony  in  society  which  ultimately  aimed  at  redefining
Romanian national identity and shaping the country’s path of development2. Theology
left thus the ivory tower of purely ecclesiastical controversies, becoming instead a major
arena of ideological confrontations in Romanian society.
 
Pluri-Confessionalism and the Romanian National
Identity : Historical Antecedents
5 The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldova have been traditionally a part of the Eastern
Orthodox Christianity, being attached to the Ecumenical Patriarchy in Constantinople.
After  the  fall  of  the  Byzantine  Empire,  Romanian  Principalities  contributed  to  the
survival of the Byzantine politico-religious traditions, a role synthesized by the Romanian
historian  Nicolae  Iorga  in  the  formula  “Byzantium  after  Byzantium”.  A  central
component of this legacy was the close bond between church and state, which assured
high clerics  considerable power and influence3.  The advent of  the Romanian modern
national-state restricted drastically the role and influence of the Church : the reforms of
Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1859-1866) secularized the patrimony of the Church and subjected
it to laic control and interests. The dominant Orthodox Church succeeded however in
preserving  a  prominent  political  profile.  The  existence  of  an  overwhelming Eastern
Orthodox Christian majority, coupled with the tradition of the old treaties (“capitulations
”)between the Principalities and the Ottoman Empire, which had forbidden the practice
of  Muslim  religion  on  Romanian  territory,  favored  a  symbolic  association  between
Romanian national identity and Orthodox Christianity. This association was expressed in
the doctrine of the “Christian state”, and was consecrated legally by article 7 of the 1866
Romanian Constitution, which read that « in Romania, only foreigners of Christian rite
can  acquire  naturalization »4.  Later,  the  Orthodox  Church  became  an  important
component of the process of nation- and state-building : the achievement of Romania’s
independence (1878) was soon followed by the autocephaly of the Romanian Orthodox
Church from the Ecumenical Patriarch (1881) and by the establishment of the Romanian
Patriarchy (1925), regarded both as a symbol of the Romanian national identity.
6 By contrast, the Romanian national community in Transylvania experienced a different
socio-political history, which accounts for its pluri-confessionalism. The Transylvanian
medieval  political  system  was  based  on  the  1437  alliance  among  three  dominant
“nations” ‑ the Hungarians, Germans, and Szeklers ‑ accompanied in 1568 by the alliance
among four received religions ‑ Catholic,  Calvin,  Lutheran and Unitarian.  This system
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excluded  Orthodox  Romanians from  significant  political  and  civic  rights.  In  1700,
following the  conquest  of  Transylvania  by  the  Habsburg  Empire,  a  part  of  the  local
Orthodox Church united with Rome. In exchange for recognizing the authority of the
Pope and certain elements of the Catholic dogma, the newly established Romanian Greek-
Catholic  Church  (alternatively  named  the  Romanian  Uniate  Church)  could  retain  its
Eastern ritual and gained access to political rights. A specific creation of the Habsburg
confessional policy, the new church was shaped by the reforming policy of Joseph II : the
quasi-importation of the millet system within the Habsburg Empire (characteristic until
then  only  to  the  Ottoman  Empire)  conferred  autonomy  to  communities  delineated
according  to  their  religion5.  This  favored  the  emergence  of  an  ethno-confessional
nationalism  among  Transylvanian  Romanians :  during  the  18th century,  the  Greek-
Catholic  Church  became  the  main  catalyst  of  the  Romanian  national  revival  in
Transylvania. Its Western educated intelligentsia played a central role in the emergence
of Romanian national ideology, while its ecclesiastical center in Blaj became a symbol of
Romanian national identity. In the first half of the 19th century, the strong revival of the
Orthodox  Church  in  Transylvania  animated  by  Metropolitan  Andrei  Saguna  raised
imperiously the problem of inter-confessional relationship within the Romanian national
community, mostly because the theological and political options of the two confessions
were strongly polarized : Greek-Catholics stressed the essential link between Romanian
national identity and Latinity, and argued for strong political and confessional ties with
Western Christianity ; by contrast, Orthodox representatives emphasized the traditional
bond between Romanian national identity and Orthodoxy, and valued the historical ties
with  the  Orthodox  Ecumenical  Patriarchy  in  Constantinople.  In  the  eve  of  the  1848
revolution,  when the political  and inter-ethnic tensions in Transylvania were acutely
raising,  the  strife  between  the  Orthodox  and  Greek-Catholic leaderships  risked  to
endanger the cause of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania. Therefore, lay
nationalist intellectuals harbored plans for a religious unity of the Romanians :  while
Greek-Catholic and Orthodox theologians saw the only possibility for religious unity in
the absorption of the rival religious community, lay nationalists advanced the formula of a
unitary and autocephalous Romanian church,  which was to encompass both religious
confessions, either in complete administrative union or as separate entities. Promoted for
the  first  time  during  the  1848  revolution  by  a  resolution  of  the  Romanian National
Assembly in Blaj (May 15, 1848), the ambiguous formula of a Romanian National Church
succeeded only temporarily in subordinating church interests to the newly discovered
religion, nationalism : the next post-revolutionary (1848-1858) decade would be one of an
unprecedented religious discord among Romanians.
7 Following the establishment of Greater Romania in 1918, the Greek-Catholic Church had
to adjust its institutionalized structure to the framework of a national-state. Facing the
arduous task of administrative integration and cultural homogenization among the newly
acquired historical provinces of Greater Romania, the Romanian political elites tried yet
again to associate both churches into a Romanian National Church and to subordinate
them to the imperious task of national consolidation : the 1923 Constitution of Romania
defined the Greek-Catholic and the Orthodox Churches as national churches and granted
them parliamentary  participation (the  two were  subsequently  referred  to  as  “sister-
churches”).  However,  the  Greek-Catholics’  inter-confessional  relationship  with  the
dominant Orthodox Church continued to be strained, been characterized by an acute
competition for material resources and spiritual prominence, rather than by cooperation.
The Orthodox leadership never fully accepted the secession of the Greek-Catholic Church
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from its ranks. That is why, in 1948, when the consolidated communist regime launched a
vigorous  political  offensive  against  the  Romanian  Greek-Catholic  Church  ‑ seen  as  a
center  of  Western  influence  and  anti-Communist  political  resistance ‑  a  militant
Orthodox leadership took advantage of those political circumstances and sponsored a
putative  ecclesiastical  synod  in  October  1948,  which  proclaimed  the  religious
“reunification” of Romanians within the Orthodox Church. Soon afterward, the Romanian
government  disbanded  the  Greek-Catholic  Church  and  handed  its  property  to  the
Orthodox Church. All Greek-Catholics who refused to comply to the union were arrested
and sentenced to prison6.
8 The  traditional  antagonism  between  the  Orthodox  and  the  Greek-Catholic  Churches
deepened  during  the  Communist  regime.  The reigning  Romanian  Communist  Party
extracted its main political legitimacy from a specific combination of decayed Marxism
and nationalism. National-communism developed thus as a hegemonic political ideology :
those who defected from the official ideology of the Communist Party were ostracized as
anti-national political figures. In this context, the Romanian Orthodox Church negotiated
very  early  a  political  compromise  with  the  Communist  regime.  In  exchange  for
supporting the political  propaganda of  the regime,  the Orthodox Church preserved a
privileged political position. Surely, the Orthodox Church suffered unavoidably from the
harsh secularization of the social  life during communism :  the atheist political power
intervened  brutally  in  ecclesiastical  matters,  persecuted  dissident  priests,  restricted
religious  education  and  discouraged  church attendance,  while  part  of  the  religious
patrimony was damaged.  But  Orthodox leaders  remained prominent  political  figures,
while the church enjoyed state protection and subsidies. By contrast, the Greek-Catholic
Church was forbidden by the Communist regime, and could function only underground.
In opposing the Communist regime, the Greek-Catholics rejected also its autarchic and
nationalist political culture, pleading instead for renewed political ties with the West. 
 
Politics and Inter-Confessional Strife in post-1989
Romania
9 Following the 1989 political change in Romania, religious life was liberalized throughout
the country :  article 29 of the 1991 Constitution of Romania expressly guarantees the
freedom of religious belief and the complete autonomy of legally established religious
cults ;  on this basis  the Romanian government has recognized and provided material
assistance to 15 religions cults7. However, the lack of an adequate legal framework forced
various  religious  cults  to  face  acute  competition for  material  resources  and political
influence, which often placed them on a collision course. 
10 First  and  foremost,  the  overall  political  upheaval  and  religious  reorganization  has
challenged  the  established  privileged  status  of  the  Romanian  Orthodox  Church.  In
reaction, the Orthodox leadership tried to prevent an imminent crisis of their church by
consolidating and expanding its political influence. To this end, the ROC attempted to
exploit its old political ties, and take advantage of its status of a dominant church, in a
country in which 87 % of the inhabitants have declared themselves Orthodox believers.
The Orthodox leadership has initiated thus a comprehensive program of spiritual pre-
eminence in society : numerous churches and monasteries have been (re)built throughout
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the country ; the theological educational system has been consolidated, and religion has
been reintroduced as a subject in primary schools, etc. 
11 In spite of these gains, the Orthodox Church has experienced nevertheless a period of
great insecurity for a variety of reasons. Unlike in the interwar period ‑ and in spite of a
strong Orthodox lobby ‑ the new Romanian Constitution did not stipulate parliamentary
representation for the ecclesiastical  leadership ;  and failed to nominate the Orthodox
Church as  the  dominant  church of  the country,  proclaiming  instead  the  equality  of
religious cults. Orthodox leaders considered these omissions as a gross disregard of their
specific interests ; in reaction, in 1994 the Holy Synod modified the Status of the ROC to
unilaterally proclaim the Orthodox Church as « national, authochephalos and unitary in
its organization » (art. 2). This assertion of an Orthodox symbolic national pre-eminence
in the relation to other religious cults was meant to compensate an alleged material
disadvantage of the Orthodox Church. Thus, Orthodox representatives bitterly denounced
the offensive of Protestant and Neo-Protestant churches in Romania, claiming that they
use their superior material resources in a proselytizing campaign directed specifically at
Orthodox believers8.  The greatest  challenge to the Orthodox spiritual  supremacy was
posed however by the resurrection of the Romanian Greek-Catholic Church. In January
1990, a decree of the new Romanian government recognized the legal existence of the
Greek-Catholic Church, while a Papal Decree reconstituted the church under the new title
of the Oriental Catholic Church of Byzantine Rite and appointed archbishops for the former
Greek-Catholic dioceses. Statistically, the revival of the Uniate Church was only partially
successful :  if  in  the  interwar  period,  Greek-Catholics  encompassed  approximately
1 500 000 believers, or 7,9 % of Romania’s population, the January 1992 census registered
only  228 377  Greek-Catholics,  representing  1 %  of  the  country’s  population  and
concentrated preponderantly  in  major  cities  of  Transylvania.  Without  a  strong rural
basis, the Greek-Catholic revival attained thus an urban and elitist character, being
animated mostly by traditional Greek-Catholic interest groups. Although it has shrunk
numerically, the Greek-Catholic Church has been however greatly favored by the 1989
political change, since it could present itself as an anti-Communist collective dissident,
with  an  essentially  European  vocation.  The  spiritual  leader  of  the  Uniate  Church,
Alexandru Todea, became the symbol of the martyrism and subsequent revival of Greek-
Catholicism in Romania after spending 16 years in prison and 25 in forced domicile arrest,
he became the first Romanian Catholic Cardinal. By contrast, the Orthodox Church bore
the stigma of a collaborating church : Romanian media examined largely the limited role
performed by the Orthodox Church in resistance to the dictatorial  regime9.  Patriarch
Teoctist, the leader of the ROC and a former deputy in the Communist Great National
Assembly, became a symbol of the regrettable compromises the Orthodox Church made
during the communist period. As a result, his leadership was deeply contested by a
significant number of believers, and even high prelates. Facing increased pressure, at the
beginning of 1990 the Patriarch withdrew temporarily from the head of the Orthodox
Church.  His  gesture  was  celebrated  by  numerous  intellectuals  as  the  beginning  of  a
necessary  process  of  moral  reformation  of  the  Orthodox  Church.  Yet  the  opposite
occurred : profiting by the general neo-communist political resurgence after the national
political elections in May 1990, Patriarch Teoctist returned in force as the head of the
ROC. While he repeatedly refused to resign, protests against his authority from the grass-
roots level  within the church were crushed with the assistance of the authorities.  In
coping with these contestations, the Orthodox Church demonstrated thus an inability to
change and re-adapt to new social demands. Instead of leading the movement for moral
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regeneration  and  introspection  of  the  past,  Orthodox  leaders  have  demonstrated
frustration  and  inflexibility.  This  conservatism of  the  Orthodox  leadership  alienated
many Romanian intellectuals. The harsh Communist regime in Romania prevented the
development  of  independent  networks  or  civic  associations.  In  this  context,  while
attempting to foster the development of  civil  institutions “from the scratch”,  radical
Westernizing  intellectuals  internalized  non-academic  stereotypes  of  an  imputed
hegemonic Western identity, essentializing very often the incompatibility between the
mysticism and lack of social activism of the Orthodoxy and rationalist and democratic
spirit of Western Christianity10. Thus, while blaming unilaterally the historical tradition
of the Orthodox Church for the insufficient modernization and weakened civil society in
Romania, Romanian intellectuals attempted to build civic society without, or ‑ according
to some radical  variants ‑  even against  the traditional  Orthodox religious component.
Instead, their sympathy turned toward Greek-Catholicism, which ‑ through its links with
the Vatican ‑ was regarded as a symbol of Romania’s European vocation.
12 The tension between these different political expectations of the Orthodox and the Greek-
Catholic  Churches  has  been  dramatically  reinforced  by  the  acute  problem  of  the
restitution of Greek-Catholic Church patrimony, which was confiscated by the communist
regime  upon  the  liquidation  of  the  Uniate  Church  in  1948  and  handed  over  to  the
Orthodox Church. Since its reestablishment in 1990, the Catholic Oriental Church has
begun an intense and sustained campaign for restitution in integrum of its lost properties.
The litigation was quickly addressed by the new political regime : in 1990, the Decree n°
126 recognized the importance and the urgency of the grievance, but recommended only
an arrangement through amiable negotiations between the two churches. In this way, a
favorable resolution of the justified Greek-Catholics demands became dependent upon
the good intentions and willingness to collaborate of the Orthodox Church, and upon the
choice of believers at the local level. In fact, as it was soon proved, the ROC was very slow
in considering the restitution demands of Greek-Catholics. This led unavoidably to open
debates among prelates and many successive crises in their inter-confessional relations.
In 1992, the Greek-Catholic Church possessed two cathedrals and 212 churches ; of these,
only 25 were returned by the Orthodox Church, while the rest were newly built churches
or were chapels “improvised” in various public buildings.  The extremely tense inter-
confessional relationship was expressed by the fact that the two religious cults agreed to
share and alternatively perform religious services in only 19 churches. Even this limited
retrocession  took  place  after  bitter  juridical  and  ecclesiastical  polemics.  While  the
Cathedral in Lugoj was returned through the good will of the local Metropolitan Orthodox
Nicolae Corneanu, the return of the historical Greek-Catholic Cathedral in Blaj occasioned
acrimonious  debates.  When  the  local  Orthodox  pastor  announced  his  conversion  to
Greek-Catholicism and turned the cathedral over to the Greek Catholic Church, Patriarch
Teoctist vehemently denounced this “Catholic aggression”, and announced his intention
to break all ecumenical ties with Vatican11. This situation provoked deep frustrations for
Greek-Catholic hierarcs : in September 1991, Cardinal Todea went so far as to declare that
« the  Uniate  Church  considers  herself  as  being  persecuted  in  Romania  by  other
Romanians »12.
13 With the advent to power of the Romanian Democratic Convention in November 1996, the
inter-confessional conflict acquired a new political significance. The new ruling coalition
was dominated by the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (NPP), established in
1926 by the merge between The Peasant Party in the Old Kingdom, and the Romanian
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National  Party  in  Transylvania.  The  NPP  encompassed  thus  a  strong  Greek-Catholic
component : the most illustrious interwar leader of the party and subsequently its cult
figure,  Iuliu Maniu,  was a  Greek-Catholic  from Blaj.  Revived after  1989,  the NPP has
adopted the Christian Democratic ideology, and has become, since 1992, a member in the
Christian–Democratic International. Since the ruling NPP defined Christian morality as
the basis of its political doctrine and opposed the legacy of secularization of social life
enforced by the communist regime, the Church has been able to make important gains in
consolidating her profile.  Suffice it  to mention that  Romania became one of  the few
countries  in  Europe  in  which  the  study  of religion  was  made  compulsory  in  state
elementary schools. The Orthodox leadership took full advantages of the new political
circumstances, but it remained, however, very insecure, fearing governmental support
for the rival Greek-Catholic Church. Indeed, Greek-Catholics also felt encouraged in their
demands  for  historical  justice  by  the  new  political  context,  since  one  of  the  most
representative political  slogans of the new ruling coalition was the restitution of the
property  nationalized  by  the  communist  regime.  Consequently,  the  Greek-Catholics
intensified their propaganda, at the precise moment when the Orthodox Church became
more unwilling to compromise.
14 The result was an aggravation of the acrimonious strife between the hierarcs of the two
confessions, expressed through a veritable “war of words”. It became imperative that the
government intervenes to cut the Gordian knot through legislative means. The “Boila
Bill”, adopted by the Senate (the upper chamber of the Romanian Parliament), in June
1997, stipulated that the Orthodox Church was obligated to return churches to Greek
Catholics, upon demand, in localities where there are several Orthodox churches. The bill
provoked  an  immense  public  scandal,  with  incendiary  reactions from  most  of  the
important Orthodox high hierarcs. Patriarch Teoctist portrayed the bill as « a dictate with
unexpected consequences for the peace of Transylvania »13 ; Iunian, the Bishop of Satmar,
threatened that  the new law could transform Transylvania « into a  Belfast  or  a  new
Yugoslavia »14,  while the Association of the Orthodox Christian Students unequivocally
characterized  the  bill  as  « legal  support  for  Catholic  proselytizing  campaign  in
Transylvania »15.  Consequently,  the  Orthodox  Church  launched  a  virulent  campaign
against the new parliamentary bill :  on September 18, 1997 a public of the Romanian
Orthodox  Archbishops  from  Transylvania  was  transmitted  to  all  members  of  the
Romanian Parliament, while the Orthodox Patriarch Teoctist appealed personally to Ion
Diaconescu (the head of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of the Romanian
Parliament), to oppose the bill. Due to this extraordinary pressure on the political power,
the Chamber of Deputies ultimately rejected the bill.
15 The political power proved thus incapable of imposing a compromise solution. Moreover,
on  the  political  arena,  the  conflict  provoked  sharp  disagreements  within  the  ruling
coalition  itself,  between  the  Democratic  Party  and  the  National  Peasant  Christian
Democratic Party. More significantly, it provoked acute controversies within the most
important party of the ruling coalition, the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party,
with  Orthodox  and  Catholic  deputies  opposing  each  other  in  vitriolic  parliamentary
debates. Thus, the Greek-Catholic priest Ioan Moisin, a NPP's senator, characterized the
political demonstration of Orthodox priests in March 1998, as “Orthodox Phariseism”, a
sign of Orthodox inflexibility and stubbornness. In reaction, another NPP’s senator, the
Orthodox  priest  Ioan  Roman,  protested  against  this  “irresponsible”  declaration,  and
Politics and Inter-Confessional Strife in post-1989 Romania: From Competition...
Balkanologie, Vol. III, n° 1 | 2007
8
denounced the duplicity of the Greek-Catholic Church, which “pressured secretly” the
political power for a favorable solution to their demands16.
16 With  the  failure  of  a  mediating  political  solution,  the  relationship  between the  two
churches reached a complete deadlock.  The negotiation process ‑ which reacquired a
central role in the contention ‑ was once again stagnating. The establishment, in February
1998, of a new central commission for dialogue, proposed by the Holy Synod of the ROC,
has been unable to give the necessary boost to the negotiations. Instead, it was clear that
the two churches had abandoned the dialogue and operated significant changes in their
conflict  strategy.  While the Uniate Church tried to reach its  objective by influencing
public opinion and political factors, the ROC chose to mobilize her priests and believers in
public manifestations. In this way, the conflict reached a new stage, that of open grass-
roots level  confrontation among the rank and file  priests  and ordinary believers.  On
March 13, 1998, the violent confrontation between Orthodox and Greek-Catholic believers
in the Church “Schimbarea la Fata” (the Transfiguration) in Cluj, was widely reported by
media,  and  provoked  genuine  emotion  and  consternation  throughout  the  country.
Nevertheless,  in  response  to  the  Greek-Catholic  occupation  of  the  church,  Orthodox
priests chose to further escalate the conflict by protesting publicly during marches and
processions in various ecclesiastical centers throughout the country. On March 20, 1998
Bartolomeu Anania, the Orthodox Archbishop of the Transylvanian diocese of Vad, Feleac
and Cluj, led an impressive march of protest of 2 500 Orthodox priests and students in
Cluj.  Thus,  instead  of  being  a  factor  of  equilibrium  in  society,  inter-confessional
relationships in Romania seemed to be rapidly deteriorating, reproducing the lines of the
acrimonious political conflicts.
17 In  the  face  of  increased pressure  from the  Greek-Catholic  Church,  the  ROC has  also
launched  a  political  offensive  aimed  at  questioning  the  existing  legally  established
relationship  between  church  and  state.  On  mid-April  1998,  Orthodox  Archbishop
Bartolomeu Anania called for a direct interference of the Church on the political scene. In
his opinion, the Church needed to become a major factor of moral orientation within
political  life,  mainly  by  recommending  a  certain  political  party  to  the  electorate.
Although according to the status of the ROC, such a decision could be taken only by the
Holy Synod of the ROC, it was nevertheless telling that Anania’s proposal was soon backed
by many Orthodox prelates.  Their controversial  declarations stirred fierce debates in
Romanian  society,  first  and  foremost  because  they  contradicted  the  Constitution  of
Romania.  Although individual priests have the right to enroll  in political  parties,  the
Church as  a  public  institution  cannot  directly  participate  in  the  political  life  of  the
country or express partisan political beliefs. The chasm between the Orthodox Church
and intellectuals seemed thus to widen yet again : a communiqué of the Civic Alliance, the
most influential Romanian civic organization, condemned unambiguously the intention
of the Orthodox Church to morally censure the political life, highlighting its potential
negative  impact  upon civil  society  in  Romania.  By  contrast,  nationalist  parties  were
instead unanimous in supporting a direct political implication of the Church. Gheorghe
Funar, the mayor of Cluj, the largest city in Transylvania, and at the time the nationalist
leader of the Alliance for the Unity of Romania, tried to exploit politically the controversy
by placing it within the context of inter-ethnic relations in Romania17. He advocated the
political  representation  in  Parliament  of  “the  Romanian  National  Church”,  an  old
nationalist  formula  used  to  designate  both  the  Orthodox  and  the  Greek-Catholic
Churches. In Funar’s opinion, would only equalize the political profiles of religious cults
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in  Romania,  since,  the  Reformat  and  Roman-Catholic  Churches  “have  been  making
politics all the time”, through the political representation of the Hungarian Democratic
Union in Romania18. The most vigorous reaction belonged to the ultra-nationalist Greater
Romania  Party,  which  has  had  close  political  ties  with  prominent  neo-communist,
nationalist Orthodox hierarcs19. Thus, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the contested leader of the
party, claimed it of a national urgency for the Church to enter the political battle, « so as
to assure the victory of the national cause »20.
18 In  this  way,  while  politicians,  journalists,  political  analysts  and  high  prelates  were
reacting to Anania’s statement, it became more and more evident that the proposal was
in fact the tip of the iceberg : we were actually facing a veritable political offensive of the
ROC, aimed at questioning the existing legally established relationship between church
and state.  This state-church crisis was also a serious warning for a potential  alliance
between nationalist parties and a frustrated ecclesiastical leadership. It is however worth
noting that most nationalist parties, while investing religious faith with an important
role  in  defining  Romanian  national  identity,  do  not  openly  differentiate  between
Orthodox and Greek-Catholics,  but  refer  rather  ambiguously  to  a  Romanian National
Church of an authochtonus tradition, composed of both “sister-churches”. This attitude
of nationalist parties is triggered by political interests : since one of their main electoral
bases is in Transylvania, and is composed of a mixture of Orthodox and Greek-Catholic
believers,  they hardly  can afford to  neglect  the  interests  of  the  local  Greek-Catholic
Church21. But it also expresses the dilemma of nationalist parties in taking sides, since
Orthodoxy and Greek-Catholicism have been both important components of Romanian
nationalism.
19 The religious strife had a great impact on Romanian foreign policy, as well. Beginning in
1994,  Romania  intensified  its  campaign  for  integration  into  NATO.  Trying  to  secure
valuable  diplomatic  support  from  the  Vatican  State,  the  Romanian  government
reestablished  its  diplomatic  representation  in  Vatican,  while  the  former  Romanian
president  Ion  Iliescu  extended  in  a  short  period  of  time  three  consecutive  official
invitations to Pope John Paul II to visit Romania. The inter-confessional conflict hindered
many of these efforts. In several occasions, the Pope specifically addressed the issue of
Greek-Catholic  patrimony retrocession,  appealing to  the Romanian government  for  a
favorable resolution to the matter. In reaction, the dominant Romanian Orthodox Church
has constantly refused to endorse a visit of the Pope in Romania, conditioning it by a
preliminary  reconciliation  of  the  Orthodox  and  Greek-Catholic  Churches.  Finally,  in
November 1997, in the midst of an intense campaign for NATO integration, the Romanian
Prime-Minister Victor Ciorbea had to report that a renewed invitation for Pope’s visit in
Romania failed because of ROC’s opposition. This gesture aimed at shaping Romania’s
foreign policy was by no means singular. If the Catholic Church leadership campaigned
for a more determined Western orientation of Romania’s policy, the Orthodox leadership
has regularly taken conservative stances in major social-political issues, a fact which led
some analysts to go so far as to appreciate that the Orthodox Church « has launched a
battle against the West »22.  For instance, the Orthodox Church vigorously opposed the
legalization of  homosexuality in Romania ‑ in spite of  the fact  that  any delay in the
harmonization of Romanian legislation with the European standard would unavoidable
hinder Romania’s potential integration into the European Union. Later, the ROC strongly
opposed  any  collaboration  between  Romania  and  NATO  in  implementing  a  military
solution in the Kosovo crisis against Yugoslavia. Far from being a simple demonstration of
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Orthodox solidarity, the gesture was suspect of expressing also a political option of the
ROC. In this way, in their conflict, Orthodox and Greek Catholic theologians took sides in
the continuous ideological debate between Westernizers, Indigens and pro-Orientals, an issue
which has monopolized the Romanian socio-political and cultural disputes in the modern
period23.
 
The Relationship between Religion and National
Identity : A Recurrent Dilemma
20 In evaluating this inter-confessional debate, it is important to note that the theological
aspects  of  the  Orthodox-Catholic  rivalry  proved  marginal.  Instead,  legal  arguments
prevailed :  the  RGCC  representatives  denounced  the  abusive  confiscation  of  their
property by the communist regime and appealed for legal and historical justice. They
argued  that  the  reunification  synod,  held  in  October  1948  in  Bucharest  was  non-
canonical,  since it  was  not  initiated by Greek-Catholic  clerics  and believers,  but  was
instigated by an aggressive Orthodox leadership, and inspired by a visit in Bucharest of
the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in early 1948. At the synod a mere 430
Uniate  priests  participated,  out  of  a  total  of  1 800 ;  significantly,  none of  the Uniate
bishops either participated or endorsed the unification act. The ultimate responsibility
for disbanding the Greek-Catholic Church belongs thus to the Romanian state, which, in
the  Decree  n°358  in  1948,  forbade  the  Greek-Catholic  Church  and  handed  over  her
properties to the Orthodox Church. This argument formed the backbone of the Greek-
Catholic thesis : if the Romanian state confiscated abusively their church’s property, it
would consequently result that it is the legal duty of the state to return it, in integrum, to
the former owner.
21 By contrast,  Orthodox representatives  pictured the 1948 ecclesiastical  synod as  « the
saint act of reunification of the Mother-Church, at the initiative of the Greek-Orthodox
clerics and believers »24. They point to the abrogation of the Concordat between Romania
and the Vatican state by the communist government in early 1948, arguing that, as a
consequence of it, Greek-Catholic property became subject to the Romanian legislation,
which  asserted  that  the  property  of  parishes  belongs  to  the  members  of  the  local
congregation.  Consequently,  in  1948,  the  Greek-Catholic  believers  « returned  to  the
Orthodox  Church  together  with  their  churches,  parochial  houses  and  their  entire
religious patrimonies »25. This demonstration was meant to reverse the thesis put forward
by the Uniate Church, by arguing that the Greek-Catholic patrimoine was not confiscated
by the state, but transferred to the Orthodox Church through the consensual conversion
of the believers, a situation that was merely consecrated by the government through a
later decree. Consequently, a retrocession of Greek-Catholic property can be made only
through amiable  inegotiations  between the two churches,  and only  according to  the
numerical  proportion of  Greek-Catholic  believers  at  the  local  level.  Since  the  Uniate
Church has shrunk to 228 000 members, it would result that Greek-Catholics are entitled
to only a limited share of their former property.
22 These antagonistic positions shaped the conflict strategy of the two churches. The Greek-
Catholic  elites  chose  to  lobby  the  political  power  for  a  juridical  solution  to  their
retrocession demands ; by contrast, deprived of its previous political ties, the Orthodox
leadership rejected any state mediation in the conflict. The violent March 1998 incident
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in Cluj was eloquent in this respect : following a favorable decision of the Supreme Court
of Justice, Greek-Catholics believers occupied the Church “Schimbarea la fata” against firm
Orthodox  resistance.  On  the  Orthodox  side,  the  juridical  decision  was  considered
illegitimate. As the local Orthodox priest of the Church “Schimbarea la fata” declared :
« We will not obey the law, since the Romanian system of justice itself does not obey the
lay, in a situation in which tens of thousand believers are thrown out of a religious edifice
simply because the Court took into account only the right to property »26. As we can see,
faced with an intense Greek-Catholic retrocession campaign, Orthodox hierarcs expressed
fears  of  a  conspiracy  between  the  political  power  and  the  Catholic  Church  against
Orthodox interests : an official communiqué by the Orthodox Archbishopry of Vad, Feleac
and  Cluj,  portrayed  the  violent  incident  in  Cluj  as  a  « Greek-Catholic  aggression,
prepared, consumed and finalized under the protection and with the complicity of the
Cluj  Police,  manipulated  by  the  militant  Greek-Catholic  prefect  of  the  Cluj  county,
Alexandru Farcas, the brother-in-law of the Senator Matei Boila »27. This argument was in
fact  a  recurrent  theme in  Orthodox propaganda,  being  directly  linked to  an  alleged
Catholic proselytizing campaign directed towards Orthodox believers. The Greek-Catholic
retrocession campaign was thus portrayed as meant to offer « a legal basis for Catholic
proselytizing among Orthodox believers,  since  its  real  aim is  not  to  obtain religious
edifices, but to convert to Catholicism the Orthodox believers who traditionally go to
those churches »28.
23 Significantly,  the  content  of  the  recent  inter-confessional  debate  exhibits  striking
similarities with the arguments advanced by theologians in the interwar period. In 1928,
a Parliamentary Bill regarding the Legal Status of Religious Cults ‑ meant to prepare the
ratification  of  the  1927  Concordat  between  Romania  and  the  Vatican ‑  triggered
vehement Greek-Catholic protests. The Uniate Church was protesting the stipulation that
in the situation of a conversion en masse of the believers of a local parish the property
would automatically be transferred to that church whose members were in majority29.
This  principle  was contrary to the Catholic  law that  asserted that  the property of  a
Catholic parish was the prerogative of the bishop. In opposing the Bill, Greek Catholic
clerics organized massive protests in several  Transylvanian cities during which there
were numerous violent clashes with the police. The debate was later transferred to the
benches of the Senate, where the Greek Catholic and Orthodox leaderships engaged in
heated polemical speeches30. Finally, the controversial article was omitted from the Law
of  the  Cults  adopted in  1928.  The following year  (1929),  the  ratification of  the  1927
Concordat  between  Romania  and  the  Vatican  was  bitterly  criticized  by  an  insecure
Orthodox leadership, which claimed that it conferred a privileged position to the Catholic
Church  in  Romania.  According  to  the  Concordat,  Catholic  institutions,  such  as
orphanages, schools and hospitals, were freed from governmental control, and this giving
rise to the Orthodox fear that the Catholic Church was “a state within the state”. As a
result,  Orthodox  hierarcs  pursued  a  virulent  press  campaign  against  the  Concordat,
especially through Patriarch Miron Cristea and Transylvanian Metropolitan Nicolae Balan
31. As a result, the intense theological debates exceeded purely ecclesiastical arguments.
In their attempts to defend their interests, theologians assumed an active role in the
debates  concerning Romanian national  identity  (“specificul  national”)  and the  path of
development. They attempted thus to develop a symbolic-ideological control over the
nation,  by  defining  the  Orthodox  church  as  the  national  spiritual  leader,  the  main
repository of Romanian traditional values. The most representative phenomenon of this
trend was the birth of Orthodoxism, a school of ideas centered on the magazine Gandirea
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[the  Thought],  which  transformed  Orthodoxy  into  an  ism,  an  ideology.  The  salient
characteristic of Orthodoxism was the re-evaluation of the relationship between religion
and nationality in Romanian national ideology, in the form of religious nationalism. The
interwar  journalist,  university  professor  and  Orthodoxist  philosopher  Nae  Ionescu
created the most authoritative syntagm of integral nationalism in interwar Romania :
« we are Orthodox because we are Romanians, and we are Romanians because we are
Orthodox »32. Ionescu’s formula united in a penetrating synthesis two of the fundamental
elements of Romanian national ideology : the peasant as a repository of ethnic purity and
traditional national values, and the Orthodox religion as a fundamental characteristic of
Romanian spirituality. Furthermore, Ionescu’s definition of Romanian identity operated a
syncretism between Orthodoxy and nationality, which, given the pluri-confessionalism of
the  Romanians,  symbolically  excluded  a  significant  part  of  them  from  the  national
community.
24 The way in which many legal,  political  and ideological  arguments  of  this  traditional
debates  recur  under  contemporary  circumstances  is  very  striking.  An  “official”
contemporary  historian  of  the  Orthodox  Church  in  Romania,  Mircea  Pacurariu,
considered that, as a result of the 1927 Concordat, the Romanian Orthodox Church was
placed « in a state of inferiority and humiliation in comparison to the Roman-Catholic
and other cults in Romania »33. The reasons invoked by Pacurariu highlighted specifically
the competition for resources among the religious cults in Romania. He accused that « the
number of counselors and Catholic priests employed by the state [was] greatly superior to
the Orthodox one (...) with substantially better salaries than the clerics of the Romanian
Orthodox Church »34. From the same perspective, Patriarch Teoctist argued in 1997 that
« the Greek-Catholic Church lives today in the nostalgia of the period 1929-1948, when
the  Concordat  between  Romania  and  the  Vatican  assured  her  a  privileged  status,
breaking thus the Constitution, the Law Regarding the Status of Religious Cults, and the
equality between religious cults »35.
25 Furthermore, although the post-1989 confessional conflict took place in the secular realm
and was part of the more general problem of post-Communist property retrocession, it is
very  telling  that  ‑ similarly  to  the  interwar  period ‑  Orthodox  and  Greek-Catholic
theologians went beyond legal or ecclesiastical polemics, composing instead competing
discourses on Romanian national identity. Its first public statement from January 8, 1990,
the Uniate Church conceived Greek-Catholicism as an essential component of the national
identity  of  the  Romanians :  « the  Romanian  Uniate  Church  is  (…)  the  institution  of
Latinity of the Romanian people »36. It also portrayed the Greek-Catholic Church as a link
between Romania and the Western world : « the Romanian Uniate Church is a religious,
but also a national institution. Because it is Catholic, it loves its people first of all, but
addresses  it,  through  its  Catholicity,  in  a  European  and  universalistic  spirit »37.  By
contrast, Orthodox theologians portrayed the establishment of the Greek-Catholic Church
as  a  departure from the  Romanian  national  tradition,  which  divided  Romanians  into
different confessions,  and opened the Pandora box of  inter-confessional  disarray and
competition. Instead, they underlined the central role played by the Orthodox faith in the
formation of the Romanian people, the only one in East Central Europe to be Christian
“from its very genesis” ; they also stressed the unique combination of Latin blood and
Orthodox  spirituality  which  assured  the  specificity  of  the  Romanian  identity  and
prevented  the  denationalization  of  Romanians.  The  identification  of  the  Romanian
Orthodox Church with the Romanian people, of Greek-Catholics with “foreigners”, and
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respectively,  of  the  post-1989  confessional  discord  with  the  1692-1700  events  ‑ were
constant  elements  of  Orthodox  propaganda.  Thus,  Antonie,  the  Metropolitan  of
Transylvania, portrayed the Greek-Catholic retrocession campaign as « an attack against
the Romanian Orthodox Church and against our people », and he warned politicians « not
to repeat the events from 1700, when foreigners caused wounds and sufferings »38. In the
same vein,  a letter by the Holy Synod of  the ROC appreciated that a solution to the
litigation concerning the Greek-Catholic property « can be reached only by taking into
account the integral aspect of the problem, from 1700 to present », since « the split of the
Orthodox Romanians from Transylvania » was achieved by the Roman Catholic Church
and  Habsburg  authorities  by  « using  false  documents,  unfulfilled  promises  and
deceiving »39. Consequently, the 1700 religions union which established the rival Greek-
Catholic  Church was  an illegitimate  religious  act,  performed not  by  conviction « but
because  of  social,  political  or  economical  reasons »40.  In  contrast,  Orthodox
representatives  suggested  a  symbolic  identification  between  Orthodoxy  and  the
Romanian people, which often took anti-democratic, nationalist overtones : in a speech
during the Orthodox procession in Cluj on March 20, 1998 Orthodox Archbishop Anania
warned  that,  similar  to  1700,  « waves  of  enemies  rise  again  against  the  Romanian
Orthodox  Church,  and  through her,  against  the  Romanian  nation » 41.  Rejecting  any
political intrusion in the life of the Church, Anania cautioned that today although « we do
not have war between us yet, we have disarray » and that « our Cross will be firm »42.
Finally, the official Orthodox celebration of the 50th anniversary of the 1948 synod, on
October 21, 1998, reiterated this position. The 1948 religious “reunification” was again
placed against the original schism of Greek-Catholics from the Orthodox Church in 1700,
and charged with powerful nationalistic overtones : the commemoration took place at
“the  Cathedral  of  National  Reunification”  in  Alba  Iulia,  and  was  linked  with  the
celebration of the Orthodox saints who revived Orthodoxy in Transylvania in the 18th
century, by opposing the offensive of the Greek-Catholic Church43. In this way, instead of
giving  pre-eminence  to  their  “Romanianness”  as  the  strongest  bound  in  their
relationship,  the  Orthodox  and  Greek-Catholic  leaderships  chose  to  monopolize  the
definition of a “real Romanian”. This strategy served at symbolically excluding the rival
confession  from  the  national  community,  and  of  curbing  thus  the  competition  for
material resources and spiritual domination.
 
Conclusions
26 Following the violent incident in Cluj, the conflict between the two churches seemed to
gradually  de-tension.  In  October  1998  was  initiated  the  first  genuine  post-1989
negotiation process between the two churches, at the initiative of the Orthodox Church
and with mediation of an observer from Vatican. A meeting between a delegation of the
ROC led by Daniel, the Metropolitan of Moldova and Bucovina, and a delegation of the
Uniate Church led by Metropolitan Lucian Muresan, was reported as a breakthrough in
the dispute44.
27 The process of reconciliation proved to be slow and strenuous, since, after years of open
confrontations, antagonistic reflexes are still persisting. Thus, parallel to the initiation of
a new negotiation process, the Romanian Orthodox Church chose to celebrate in October
1998 and for the first time in her history, the 50th anniversary the 1948 “reunification”
synod. Nevertheless, the October bilateral meeting seemed to mark the beginning of a
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period of improved inter-confessional tolerance in Romania. In January 1999, fifteen high
hierarcs of the Greek-Catholic and Orthodox Churches signed an agreement intended to
put  an  end  to  a  period  of  nine  years  of  acute  polemics  and  violent  confrontations.
Without solving all  the contentious problems, the document, celebrated by Romanian
media as “the Peace from Blaj”, reinstated the dialogue as the only mean of solving inter-
confessional disputes45. Following the request of the Orthodox Church, the Greek-Catholic
Church has committed herself to withdrawing all the current juridical and legislative
actions addressing the issue of patrimony retrocession, and to renounce any attempt of
forceful  occupation  of  religious  edifices,  or  to  encourage  proselytizing  actions.  In
exchange, the Orthodox Church has recognized the Greek-Catholic de facto possession
over approximately 100 religious edifices acquired after 1989, regardless the manner they
were obtained ; and expressed its willingness to establish mixed local commissions for
negotiating further  retrocession in  rural  localities  where  there  are  several  Orthodox
churches, but only upon demand and providing that there is a consensual agreement of
the  local  Orthodox  priest  and  believers.  The  two  parts  still  disagreed  on  church
retrocession in urban localities, and sought for solutions in localities in which there exists
only one religious edifice for both communities.
28 This confessional reconciliation has removed thus the major domestic stumbling block
against the visit of Pope John Paul II’s in Romania. However, the itinerary and the specific
content of his visit occasioned yet another competition for symbolic capital between the
two  churches.  Greek-Catholics  exercised  a  strong  lobby  for  the  Pope’s  visit  to  their
ecclesiastical center in Blaj ; in March 1999, a manifest signed by 50 leading Romanian
politicians supported their intention. By contrast, radical Orthodox factions expressed
concerns that the visit of the Pope is an integral part of a concerted Catholic proselytizing
campaign  for  regaining  to  Greek-Catholicism millions  of  Romanians  and  Ukrainians.
Their opposition was strengthened by the intransigent attitude of the Russian Orthodox
Patriarch Alexei, who, in exchange for a refusal of the Romanian Orthodox Church to
endorse  the  Pope’s  visit,  expressed  his  readiness  to  negotiate  an  extension  of  the
jurisdiction of the ROC in Bessarabia46. Ultimately, the visit of the Pope John Paul II in
Romania, which occurred in May 7-9, 1999, was a major political success for the Orthodox
Church,  being  appreciated  by  the  Romanian  Foreign-Minister,  Andrei  Plesu,  as  « a
decoration  on  the  Patriarch’s  robe »47.  Through  strained  negotiation,  the  Romanian
Orthodox leadership prevented a visit of the Pope in Transylvania. In this way, while
reducing the religious significance of the Pope’s visit for the rival Greek-Catholic Church,
the Romanian Orthodox Church could exploit fully the political benefits of the event. The
visit  of  the  Pope  consecrated  the  reconciliation between the  Greek-Catholic  and the
Orthodox Churches : in a third bilateral meeting at Rimet, in June 14, 1999, the Greek-
Catholic  Church  has  abandoned  the  principle  of  restituio  in  integrum of  her  former
property, limiting her request to 160 churches and 70 religious edifices48. It also suggested
a decisive emancipation of the Romanian Orthodox Church from the political influence of
Moscow, increasing thus its domestic and international prestige. On a more general level,
the first visit of a Pope in a preponderant Orthodox country was meant to signal an epoch
of renewed confessional dialogue between Orthodoxy and Catholicism49. In the midst of
the Kosovo crisis, the Pope and the Patriarch appealed for an end to the war and the
implementation of a diplomatic solution to the conflict.
29 In conclusion, the resurrection of the Greek-Catholic Church in post-1989 Romania was
partially successful. Following the 1989 political change, the Greek-Catholic Church was
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in a political offensive, favored by its ties to the Vatican and by Romania’s efforts at
building a democratic society and at gaining access to European institutions. The newly
revived church enjoyed thus the sympathy of  numerous politicians,  intellectuals  and
emerging civil associations. By contrast, after the collapse of the communist regime the
Orthodox Church was quasi-isolated and had to face an increased pressure for internal
reforms : numerous intellectuals expressed concerns that the tradition of the Orthodox
Church in supporting authoritarian political regimes and its conservatism could hinder
the development of civil society and Romania’s aspiration for Western integration. In this
context, the inter-confessional conflict over patrimony retrocession had a great impact
on shaping the post 1989 trajectory of the two churches : lacking a strong mass basis, the
Greek-Catholic  elites  chose  to  use  political  and  juridical  means  for  attaining  their
objectives ;  by  contrast,  an  isolated  Orthodox  leadership  opted  for  a  populist
Orthodoxism, with powerful nationalist overtones. However, Greek-Catholics were soon
trapped in their strategy of elitist political lobby : the ruling National Peasant Christian
Democratic Party proved unable to foster a Christian-Democratic movement, similar to
the kind of social activism that characterizes Western Christian Democracy. Instead, the
party was torn by the competing interests of its Orthodox and Greek-Catholic factions ;
ultimately,  failing  to  reach  its  maximal  objectives,  the  main  Greek  Catholic  interest
group,  centered around the  Greek-Catholic  priest  Matei  Boila,  defected the  NPP and
formed  the  Christian-Democratic  Alliance.  The  end  of  the  conflict  found  thus  the
Romanian Orthodox Church engaged in a genuine political offensive. Nevertheless, on the
long run,  the strategy of  connecting the religious conflict  to the sharp debates over
national  ideology in  Romania  proved  to  be  a  winning  card  for  the  ecclesiastical
leadership : consequence of the conflict, the symbolic capital of the two churches has
paradoxically increased. In May 1999, invoking their contribution to achieving the much-
desired religious reconciliation, Romanian President Emil Constantinescu decorated the
leaders of the Romanian Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Churches, namely the Orthodox
Patriarch Teoctist and the Greek-Catholic Cardinal Alexandru Todea, in a gesture meant
to symbolize a restored collaboration between the Church and the political  power in
Romania.
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